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SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR DEFINING AND CLASSIFYING
HEARSAY
EDMUND M. MORGAN

f

To one who attempts to classify the almost numberless authorities dealing with the admissibility of utterances two questions present themselves at
the outset: What is hearsay, and Why do Anglo-American courts refuse to
receive it in evidence? Search for satisfactory answers may be facilitated
by an elementary analysis of the function of a witness and of the process by
which a trier uses testimony in resolving an issue of fact.
Suppose that P desires to establish to the satisfaction of T the proposition that D committed act X. He brings W before T and puts to W a
question. W utters a series of sounds. By them he intends to express a
proposition; by them he seems to T to be saying: "I saw D commit act X",
or "I heard D commit act X." From this auditory experience, T makes the
following inferences, each of which after the first depends upon the one
preceding it: (i) That W said, "I saw (or heard) D commit act X"; (2)
that W was trying to express the proposition usually expressed by those
words; (3) that W then and there believed that he saw (or heard) D commit act X; and (4) that W's then existing belief was caused by his prior
experience of seeing (or hearing) D commit act X. As to the content of
Vs utterance T must rely upon his own sense of hearing and his own power
of translating sounds into ideas. As to the correspondence between W's
language and D's conduct, T will be dependent upon W's perception, recollection, narration and veracity, and must make a finding or assumption concerning each of these in order to reach any rational conclusion as to the
truth of P's proposition. And it can make no difference to either W or T
that D's conduct consisted of an utterance, that it was vocal rather than nonvocal or verbal rather than non-verbal.'
If T is a court, W will be required to make his utterance under conditions calculated to induce him to tell what he believes to be the truth, and to
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1. All this may seem too elementary to justify statement. It is suggested, however, that
had Dean Wigmore had such an analysis in mind, he would have written §§ 267 and 271 of
his treatise somewhat differently. It is possible, too, that if Professor John S. Strahorn, Jr.
had taken the trouble to make articulate the steps in the series of mental operations of the
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exactly what he means by "relevant circumstantial conduct" as applied to assertive utterances
in his interesting article, A Reconsderation of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions (1937) 85
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enable T to put a fair value upon it. W will have to speak under oath, subject to a penalty for perjury, usually at a public hearing in the presence of T.
If the court is a common law court, he will also be subject to confrontation
and cross-examination by the party against whom his utterance is offered.
Knowledge of this will be an additional stimulus to his desire to tell the
truth; and cross-examination in T's presence, if intelligently exercised, will
furnish T a solid basis for valuing W's testimony. If W refuses to submit
to any of these conditions, he will not be heard.
Now assume that W's language, as interpreted by T, is "B told me that
he saw (or heard) D commit act X." Here again W intends to express a
proposition concerning his own personal experience with B; here again T
will go through the same series of mental processes to determine whether W
actually had that experience; but when T has concluded that B did utter the
words reported by W, T has done no more than find that B in W's presence
expressed a proposition concerning a personal experience of B. B is not
now under oath or subject to a penalty for perjury or speaking publicly in
the presence of T. Neither is he now confronted or subject to crosseramination by the party against whom his utterance is offered. Furthermore none of these stimuli or safeguards was present at the time B spoke.
Yet P is asking T to rely upon B's perception, recollection, narration and
veracity; and if T is to make a finding regarding D's conduct, T must treat
B in all respects as in the former case T treated W. In short, upon the issue
of B's conduct, P is presenting W as the witness, but upon the issue of D's
conduct, he is offering B as the witness. In this instance B is performing all
the functions which W performed in the prior case.
W would not have been heard in this case as to B's conduct or in the
prior case as to D's conduct unless he had submitted to the prescribed conditions designed to stimulate honesty of utterance by him and to make possible intelligent evaluation of his testimony by T. It would seem to follow
that P cannot be permitted to avoid the imposition of these conditions upon
B by the device of transmitting B's testimony through W. Analytically B's
utterance is hearsay, and its reception would render nugatory most of the
regulations prescribed for witnesses. Analytically an utterance offered for
a purpose which requires the trier to treat the utterer as a witness is hearsay
unless the utterer was, when making it, subject to all the conditions imposed
upon a witness. 2 And consistency would seem to require the rejection of
such hearsay utterances.
In the field of evidence, however, the evolution of forms of trial, historical accident and considerations of policy often prevent the judicial deci2. Professor Strahorn's exposition, supra note i, at 484-486, seems to call for this conclusion, though he would probably not agree with the course of reasoning by which it is

reached.
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sions from reflecting the results of sound analysis and logical consistency.
The hearsay rule, as developed by our courts, therefore, may reveal a somewhat different concept from that which our analysis would suggest. Never
in the history of our law has all hearsay been rejected. While jurors were
in fact "witnesses selected by a public officer," 3 they were entitled to rely
upon information secured "through the words of their fathers and through
such words of persons whom they are bound to trust as worthy". 4 And
when the parties became privileged to present additional matter through
witnesses of their choice, hearsay was freely received. Near the end of the
1500's serious objection was made, but another century elapsed before it
became established that hearsay was ordinarily inadmissible; it was not until
well into the 18th century that it was rejected when offered as corroborative
evidence. The reason given for its exclusion in the earlier decisions is lack
of oath; but in 1668 and 1696 in cases where sworn hearsay was tendered it
was rejected for lack of opportunity of the opponent to cross-examine. 5
During this period the jury was becoming less and less a body of witnesses
and more and more a tribunal basing its answers upon evidence submitted
in court; the parties were accordingly getting greater and greater control
of the course of litigation, and were in effect determining the body of
3.

THAYER, PRELnmINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (898)
56.
4. This is Dean Wigmore's translation of part of the last sentence of Chapter 17 of Book
II of GLANVILL, DE LEGiBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI ANGLIAE. In BRUNNER, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER SCHWURGERICHTE (1872) 427, appears the following: "Die Geschwornen der
Assise sind ja berechtigt, auf Grund von Mittheilungen glaubwfirdiger Nachbarn auszusagen). Sie offenbaren sonach in ihrem Ausspruche eigentlich die in der Gemeinde fiber die
betreffende Beweisfrage herschende Ueberzeugung." The footnote indicated refers back to
page 287, where this sentence occurs: "Nach Glanvilla ist es zur Wissenschaft der Geschwornen erforderlich
quod per proprium visum suum et auditum
illius rei habuerint notitiam vel per verba
patrum suorum et per talia quibus fidem teneantur
habere ut propriis."
The foregoing is given thus in 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1364:
"1872, Professor Heinrich Brunner, The Origin of Jury Courts, 427, 452: ' • • The
jurors of the assize were certainly entitled to give a verdict based on the communications of
trustworthy neighbors. Glanvill makes it requisite, for the jurors' knowledge, "that they
should have knowledge from their own view and hearing of the matter or through the words
of their fathers and through such words of persons whom they are bound to trust as worthy."
Thus they exhibit really in their verdict the prevailing conviction of the community upon the
matter in question . . .'
BEAMES, A TRANSLATION oF GLANVILL (1900) 54, translates the last sentence of Chapter
17 of Book II thus: "With respect to the knowledge requisite on the part of those sworn, they
should be acquainted with the merits of the cause, either from what they have personally seen
and heard, or from the declarations of their Fathers, and from other sources equally entitled
to credit, as if falling within their own immediate knowledge." The text as printed in Woodbine's edition (1932) of GLANVILL, op. cit. supra, at 68, is as follows: "Ad scientiam autem
eorum qui super hoc iurant inde habendam, exigitur quod per proprium visum suum et auditum illius rei habeant notitiam, vel per verba patrum suorum, et per talia quibus fidem teneantur habere ut propriis."
Glanvill in the quoted passage is discussing the Grand Assize. No doubt the same statement could have been made of the petty assizes.
5. 2 Roll. Abr. 679, f9 (1668) ; see Rex v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 165 (1696). See generally Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence (1937) 4 U. OF CHL L.
REV. 247.
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material upon which the jury could act. By the middle of the 1700's this
control was almost complete; the jury could no longer act on information
acquired by them outside the evidence presented in court, and hearsay was
definitely inadmissible.
As our system thus changed from an investigative to an adversary one,
the rule rejecting hearsay and that making opportunity for cross-examination
a prerequisite to admissibility developed side by side. Was this a mere
coincidence? Compare the civil law. That, like the common law, imposes
upon witnesses the formalities of the oath and its accompanying sanctions;
it sometimes requires confrontation. It has, however, retained the features
of an inquisitorial system and has not adopted the adversary theory of litigation. It does not provide for anything like the Anglo-American crossexamination. 6 And it does not reject hearsay. Is it due to mere historical
accident that the inquisitorial system, which has no cross-examination,
receives hearsay while the adversary system, which insists on cross-examination, excludes hearsay? It hardly seems reasonable so to conclude. Furthermore, it is generally conceded that of all the conditions imposed upon a
witness, quite the most important is that which subjects him to crossexamination. It is, therefore, easy to find support for Mr. Wigmore's dicta
that "the Hearsay rule, as accepted in our law, signifies a rule rejecting
assertions,offered testimonially, which have not been in some way subjected
to the test of Cross-examination"7 and it is "that rule which prohibits the
use of a person's assertion, as equivalent to testimony to the fact asserted,
unless the assertor is brought to testify in court on the stand, where he may
be probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his assertion and of his
qualifications to make it." 8
If, however, these statements are to take the place of definitions, they
leave much to be desired. They are not identical in meaning or in connotation. The first implies that the assertion will escape condemnation as hearsay
if it was in some way subjected to cross-examination. Even if "cross-.
examination" contemplates, an official proceeding before a tribunal empow6. 2 BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JUDIcIAL EVIDENCE (Mills ed. 1827) 433-434: "Among
those who in its native country are so cordial in their admiration of this mode of trial [trial
by jury], there are not twenty perhaps who at this moment are aware that, in contradistinction to Roman jurisprudence, the mode of extracting the evidence on this occasion is as peculiar to English procedure as the constitution of the court. The peculiarity of the practice
called in England cross-examinationi-the complete absence of it in every system of procedure
grounded on the Roman, with the single exception of the partial and narrow use made of it
in the case of confroqtation,--is a fact unnoticed till now in any printed book, but which will
be as conclusively as concisely ascertained at any time, by the impossibility of finding a word
to render it by, in any other language."
In Continental practice, the exam3 WGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1367, n. 2: "...
ination of witnesses is in theory conducted by or through the judge, by repetition of questions, and in practice cross-examination is so casual or so feeble as to be a negligible quantity...

.

7. Id. at § 1362.
8. Id. at § 1364.
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ered to compel cross-examination, the implication is too broad; it is opposed
to countless cases. The second statement shifts the emphasis from the assertion to the asserter. He must be brought to testify in court, presumably the
court to which the assertion is being offered. There he is to be subject to
probing by cross-examination, but the assertion may have been made elsewhere. Here again, any implication that all assertions falling without the
confines of this prohibitory rule are non-hearsay runs afoul of numerous
authorities. Neither Mr. Wigmore's demonstration of the importance of
cross-examination as an engine for the discovery of truth, nor his theory
that hearsay is excluded by the Anglo-American law because of lack of
opportunity for cross-examination by the opponent, nor yet the effect of the
decisions dealing with the admissibility of utterances requires a definition
deducible from these statements. Mr. Wigmore's theory may be accepted
and harmonized with the results of the suggested analysis by reframing the
analytical definition: An utterance offered for a purpose which requires the
trier to treat the utterer as a witness is hearsay unless the utterer makes it
subject to cross-examination at the trial or hearing at which it is so offered.
Practically this would always produce the same result as the strict analytical
definition, for wherever the utterer is thus subject to cross-examination, he
is also subject to all the other conditions imposed by law upon witnesses.
II
If a person uses non-verbal conduct instead of words for the purpose
of expressing a proposition and if that conduct is offered as evidence of the
truth of the proposition, it should be treated exactly as if it consisted of
words. For example, if F flees for the purpose of drawing suspicion upon
himself, he might as well shout, "I did the act" or "I am guilty." It is quite
as necessary that he be under a stimulus to tell the truth as if he had used
words to express the proposition. His perception, recollection and veracity
need quite as much testing by cross-examination if the trier is to put a fair
value upon his conduct. But suppose that F flees only for the purpose of
escaping. His flight is everywhere regarded as relevant upon the issue of
his guilt. He is not trying to express any proposition, much less the proposition that he is guilty. Neither his veracity nor his narration is in any way
involved, once granted that his flight is for the sole purpose of escape. But
how is it from the viewpoint of T? When P offers F's flight as evidence of
F's guilt, T must first interpret this non-verbal conduct to determine whether
F intended to express the proposition that he was guilty. This requires T
to ascertain whether Fs conduct honestly reflected his state of mind,-essentially the same thing that is required where Fs conduct is an assertion. If T
decides that F was acting solely for the purpose of escaping, then T may
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well infer that F believed himself to be guilty. In order to find that F's
state of mind at the time of the flight was caused by his experience of doing
the act charged, T must rely upon F's perception and recollection. T has no
opportunity to see F and is entirely without the aid of cross-examination to
test the relevant aspects of F's perception and recollection. And it is a truism
that the most efficient device for exposing the worth of testimony is crossexamination and that the most valuable function of cross-examination is its
discovery of defects in observation and memory. Consequently in such a
case T, without the benefit of hearing F cross-examined, is put to relying
upon F for the most important functions performed in the usual case by a
witness. Where F is not a party to the action, most courts in effect make
this analysis, declare F's conduct to be the equivalent of a confession and
classify it as hearsay.9
Where Fs perception and recollection have to do only with his own
voluntary conduct of a striking or unusual character, the dangers of reliance
upon his perception and recollection may be negligible; in exceptional instances they may be enormous. Where Fs conduct leads first to an inference
concerning his state of mind, and thence to an inference concerning the
conduct of a third person or other external matter, F's perception and recollection are of primary importance. For example if the issue is the life or
death of X, evidence that F paid to X's beneficiary the full amount of an
insurance policy issued by F upon the life of X would require T to rely
heavily upon Fs perception and to a varying degree upon his recollection.
If F were present and offering to testify that X was dead, and refused to be
cross-examined as to his perception and recollection, he would not be heard.
Consequently it would not be out of accord with good sense to put F's nonverbal conduct in the same category as verbal hearsay.
In some instances utterances are offered to prove not the truth of the
matter asserted in them but to prove that the utterer believed it to be true
and was therefore mentally abnormal. Here his perception and recollection
are immaterial; but his narration and sincerity are of the utmost importance.
Unless his words, with the meaning ordinarily given to them by him, would
reflect an irrational belief and unless he speaks seriously and in good faith,
the utterance is no evidence of mental abnormality. When offered as such
evidence, the need for cross-examination is clearly indicated, and a classification which puts the utterance within the bounds of hearsay would not be
unreasonable.
It is, therefore, suggested that hearsay might be conveniently defined as
including (I) all conduct of a person, verbal or non-verbal, intended by him
to operate as an assertion when offered either to prove the truth of the matter
9. E. g., State v. Piernot, 167 Iowa 353, 149 N. W. 446 (1914), criticised in (1915) 28
1-Iv. L. Rnv. 429.
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asserted or to prove that the asserter believed the matter asserted to be true,
and (2) all conduct of a person, verbal or non-verbal, not intended to operate
as an assertion, when offered either to prove both his state of mind and the
external event or condition which caused him to have that state of mind or
to prove that his state of mind was truly reflected by that conduct. This
would require a further modification of our analytical definition: any conduct of a person, verbal or non-verbal, offered for a purpose which requires
the trier to treat that person as a witness to the extent of relying upon his
perception, recollection, narration or veracity is hearsay unless that conduct
is subject to cross-examination at the trial or hearing at which it is so
offered. 10
I

The problem of classifying four groups of assertive utterances has
caused controversy: (i) records of past perception, (2) declarations of
intent accompanying ambiguous non-verbal conduct of the declarant, the
legal significance of which depends upon the accompanying intent, (3) declarations made contemporaneously with a non-verbal act, independently
admissible, and explaining, qualifying or throwing light upon it, and (4)
admissions. Are these utterances hearsay?
"(i) Where a witness convinces the court that he made or verified a
memorandum at or about the time of an event which it purports to record
and that he then knew that it correctly recorded the event, but that he has
now forgotten and is unable to testify about it from present memory, the
content of the memorandum is admissible. The hearsay objection is rarely
made, and then only when the memorandum is not produced and its content is
sought to be proved by oral testimony. The question discussed is the testimonial qualification of the witness and the use of the memorandum as an
aid to his recollection. In some courts the witness may read to the jury the
content of the paper, but the paper itself is not receivable,"- on the theory
that the witness is now adopting the content as his present testimony and is
permitted to do so because he formerly knew it to be true and now knows it
to be true.

12

Analytically the memorandum is hearsay. The assertions in it were
made in the absence of the conditions imposed upon witnesses. To be sure,
the asserter is presently subject to all those conditions. He is stimulated to
tell what he believes to be the truth about the recorded event but he can speak
io. See generally McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 489;
Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay (1935) 48 HARV. L. REV. 1138.
ii. See Gurley v. Springfield Street Ry., 2o6 Mass. 534, 537, 92 N. E. 714, 715 (IgIo).
12. Cf. Floyd v. Pugh, 2O Ala. 29, 33, 77 So. 323, 327 (1917), stating that proper verification of the memorandum "legalizes and lets in both the testimony of the witness and the
memorandum. The two are declared to be equivalent of a present, positive statement of the
witness, affirming the truth of the contents of the memorandium." And see 2 WIGMOR, op.
cit. supra note 4, § 754.
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only of making or verifying the record. There is no real opportunity to test
his perception or his recollection of the event, for he begins by saying that
he has no present memory of it. His narration and his desire to tell the
truth can be pretty effectively examined; but it must be obvious that in so
far as the conditions imposed upon witnesses generally can be applied to him,
they are much less likely to produce data which will enable the trier to put a
fair valuation upon his testimony than in the case where prior statements,
whether consistent or inconsistent, are offered as to an event to which the
witness is testifying from present memory. And it is universally agreed that
such prior statements are hearsay. Whether the record of past recollection
and the prior statements should be treated differently as to admissibility is
quite another question. 13
(2) Declarations in the second group have been said to be non-hearsay,
because they are "verbal acts" 14 or are "utterances which are parts of relevant
conduct and which come in as conduct and not as narration alone." 15 The
validity of this classification may be tested by a familiar case. Suppose that
D, a resident of Maine, while on a local pleasure trip between Bangor and
Portland, says, "I intend to move to Pasadena, California, and to make that
place my permanent home thereafter." Here is a declaration of a presently
existing state of mind. In all jurisdictions it is classed as hearsay. In some,
wherever relevant, it is received as an exception; in others it is rejected.
Now assume that D makes exactly the same statement while between Bangor
and Portland on a trip to Pasadena. Upon the issue of change of domicile,
the journey is a relevant, ambiguous, non-verbal act, and its legal significance
depends upon the intent with which D makes it. To evidence that intent the
declaration is everywhere admissible. 16 Is it any the less narrative because
it accompanies the non-verbal act? Is it used by the trier in any different
way or for any different purpose? There can be but one answer. To classify
it as hearsay in the one instance and as non-hearsay in the other is little
short of capricious.
(3) The judicial opinions concerning declarations made contemporaneously with an otherwise admissible non-verbal act and tending to throw
13. Dean Wigmore apparently considers the hearsay rule in no way involved. He treats
the matter under Testimonial Recollection. Id. at § 737 (2). Professor Strahorn treats the
content of the memorandum as hearsay but declares it admissible as partially satisfying the
hearsay rule. Strahorn, mspra note i, at 496 et seq. It may be worth noting that he would
receive for the truth of the matter asserted in them prior contradictory statements which the
witness concedes having made, but not those which have to be proved by others after denial
by the witness. He believes this to be the view of Dean Wigmore. It is suggested that he
has misread the text: "when admitted" means "when received in evidence", not "when conceded by the witness". Dean Wigmore would hardly have used the word "admitted" in this
sense in § ioi8, when in § io48, nI. 2, he refers to "the well-worn professional jest" in which
"admit" is used in the sense of "concede".
14. See 3 WiGmoRE, op. cit.
supra note 4, § 1772-1786, particularly §§ 1782-1785.
15. See Strahorn, supra note I, at 491, n. II.
16. See Holyoke v. Estate of Holyoke, xio Me. 469, 87 AtI. 40 (1913).
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light upon it are frequently phrased in the obscure and obscuring language
of res gest.'1.7 Often, too, the non-verbal act is an exciting event which puts
the declarant under the stress of a nervous excitement, so that the declaration
may be treated as a "spontaneous exclamation". But in some instances the
non-verbal act is so casual or routine as to occasion no nervous stress of any
kind. Thus, where plaintiff and his engineer were moving a steam engine
along a highway by the use of steam-power and horse-power, plaintiff ordered the engineer to shut off the steam; the engineer answered that he had
done so. Upon the issue whether the engine was then being propelled by
steam, the engineer's statement was offered to show that the steam had been
shut off. i Again upon the issue of the speed of a train, a remark by a passenger on "the short period of time consumed in passing" between two
designated stations was offered and received.' 9 In these two instances the
court was of the opinion that the declarations were admissible as parts of
the res gestae. Such statements the great Thayer and his more famous disciple classify as hearsay. The former believed them admissible because they
imported "what was then present or but just gone by, and so was open, either
immediately or in the indications of it, to the observation of the witness who
testifies to the declaration, and who can be cross-examined as to these indications. .
,,20 The latter considers them inadmissible except where the
non-verbal act or event puts the speaker under the stress of a nervous excitement which makes his declaration spontaneous. And the majority of the
courts agree with Mr. Wigmore. Analytically these declarations are hearsay; the declarant is performing all the functions of a witness and is subject
to none of the conditions imposed upon witnesses. If this is true, what
difference can it make that the testimony accompanies an act or event which
is independently admissible? As to admissibility it may be all important;
as to its hearsay or non-hearsay quality, it is altogether immaterial. It helps
not at all to assert that the words are non-narrative, for they fall squarely
within the dictionary definition of narration. They may by a little stretch
of the imagination be said not to be narrative of a past event; but narrative
of a contemporaneous event they certainly are, and they are offered for the
truth of the matter narrated, and for no other purpose.
17. When counsel was attempting to introduce certain hearsay, Holmes, J., presiding,
said: "No, the hearsay rule has been a good deal nibbled round the edges, but nobody has
taken quite such a bite out of it as that. And I think I won't set the example." "Not as part
of the res gestae?" asked counsel. Holmes, J., replied: "The man who uses that phrase has
lost temporarily all power of analyzing ideas. For my part, I prefer to give articulate reasons for my decisions." Ex relatione Samuel Williston as recorded in an unpublished journal
of James Bradley Thayer (1895).
18. Stebbins v. Keene Twp., 55 Mich. 552, 22 N. W. 37 (1885).
ig. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Collier, 62 Tex. 318 (1884).
20. THAYER, Bedingfield's Case-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta in LEGAL
EssAYs (io8) 207, 302, also to be found in (1881) 15 Am.L. REv. 71, 107. See Morgan,
A Suggested Classificationof Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae (1922) 31 YALE L. J. =9,
236.
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(4) Three theories have been advanced in support of the proposition
that admissions do not constitute hearsay. Greenleaf, apparently relying
upon what he believed to be the opinion of Mascardus, considered them "as
a substitute for the ordinary and legal proof; either in virtue of the direct
consent and waiver of the party, as in the case of explicit and solemn admissions, or on grounds of public policy and convenience, as in the case of those
implied from assumed character, acquiescence or conduct." 21 Wharton,
expressing the same idea, said, "an admission is a fact to be proved by evidence, not evidence to prove a fact." 22 These writers seemed to put extrajudicial admissions in the same class as judicial admissions. They find no
followers in either modern judges or modern commentators. The second
view treats an admission not as evidence of the matter asserted in it but
merely as impeaching the position taken by a party in his pleadings and at
the trial in the same way that a prior contradictory statement is used to impeach a witness. This seems to be advocated by Mr. Wigmore in the sixteenth edition of Greenleaf and in the first edition of his own masterpiece.2 3
If so, it is abandoned in the second edition and is not accepted by the courts.
The third theory, that admissions constitute not testimonial but circumstantial evidence of the truth of their content has been suggested by Mr. Wigmore, 24 and has recently been restated and elaborated by Professor Strahorn.
He says that they "are usable because they are the relevant conduct of a party
or of one having a relevant relation to a party, and that therefore they can
be rationalized without reference to their trustworthiness even if they might
possess narrative value also." 25
Just what does this mean? How is this conduct relevant? In much
the same way that a prior inconsistent statement of a witness is relevant.
The "unfavorable verbal conduct of a party litigant may be offered against
him because of the circumstance of its inconsistency with the validity of his
present contention by pleading. The circumstance of the party's statement
being at variance with his present contention by pleading is such a cogent one
that it may be considered by a jury, even to the extent of giving it the same
weight as if the facts apparently narrated in it (if it does also happen to
have narrative content) were true." 26 This calls for critical examination.
Suppose the issue to be whether D, a party to the action, or B, a third
person, committed act X. W offers to testify that he heard B say: "I com21. i GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE (Ist

ed. 1842) § 169. This was repeated in the succeeding

fourteen editions.
22. 2 WHIARTON, EVIDENCE (Ist ed. 1877) § Io75. See also Hamersley, J., in State v.
293, 308, 41 Atl. 82o, 824 (1898).
23. I GREENLEAI, EVIDENCE (I6th ed. 1899) § 169; 2 WIGmOPE, EVIDENCE (st ed. i9o4)
§ 1048. See also Note (1920) 34 HAlr. L. REv. 205.

Willis, 7i Conn.

op. cit. supra note 23, § 267.
25. Strahorn, supra note I, at 570.
24. 1 WIGUtORE,

26. Id. at 573.
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mitted act X." No one doubts that B's utterance, if made, is relevant verbal
conduct of B. But how relevant? As the basis for inferences by T that B
intended to convey the idea ordinarily expressed by these words, that he
believed what he said, and that his belief was caused by his commission of
act X. If B makes his statement directly to T, it is direct, as distinguished
from circumstantial, evidence as those terms are ordinarily used. If B's
statement is transmitted to T by W, it is, of itself, none the less direct. It is
universally classed as hearsay.
Assume further that B has already testified at the pending trial: "I did
not commit act X." In what way does this affect the relevancy of W's
testimony? Upon the issue of B's commission of the act, T must still answer
the questions: (i) Did B use the words reported by W? (2) If so, did he
intend to express the idea usually conveyed by those words? (3)If yes, did
he believe them to be true? (4) If he did, what caused him to have that
belief? In seeking answers, T will be aided by B's testimony, and by the
fact of its inconsistency with his former statement. If the answers 'to the
first two are in the affirmative, they will also help T to set a value upon B's
testimony. The result may be that T will conclude that it is impossible to
determine whether B was telling the truth on either occasion, or that his
former story was true and his testimony mistaken or deliberately false. The
courts, however, will permit T to go no farther than to find that B's testimony is worthless. They will not allow a finding of the truth of B's former
statement. Why? Because it is hearsay, and the inconsistency between it
and B's testimony alters this characteristic not one whit.
If the statement and testimony are by D instead of B, in what respect
can the analysis be different? The questions that T will have to answer and
the processes for reaching results will be identical. Even though D does not
testify, the position which he is taking in his pleadings and at the trial is
said to be the equivalent of testimony by him that he did not commit act X.
It is quite as inconsistent with his former statement; but it cannot in the
slightest degree change the questions which T must put concerning W's testimony or the processes by which T reaches his result. T must treat D, when
making the former statement, as a witness, and must subject D's assertion to
exactly the same processes as any other assertion received in evidence. If
the former statement is hearsay when made by B, it is equally hearsay when
made by D. Doubtless it tends to impeach the speaker, be he B or D, by its
inconsistency with the position he takes at the trial in his testimony or otherwise. When offered for its truth, it is rejected as hearsay if made by B;
if made by D, it is received notwithstanding its hearsay character, and regardless of the circumstances under which it was uttered.2 7 They may or
27. This statement is too broad if applied to that species of admissions which are usually
classed as confessions. The circumstances under which a confession was uttered may cause
its exclusion.
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may not have furnished a guaranty of its trustworthiness or an indicium of
its intrinsic superiority. Its admissibility depends upon quite different con28
siderations.
IV
Admissions, dying declarations, pedigree statements and certain entries
in books and documents have always been received by the Anglo-American
courts.2 9 Why did they escape condemnation when the hearsay rule took
form? Why have various utterances of persons speaking other than as witnesses in open court been admitted in evidence? Is it possible so to classify
the decisions as to make this branch of the law appear consistent and sensible? Does Mr. Wigmore give satisfactory answers? Beginning with Mr.
Thayer's postulate that the Anglo-American law of evidence is the child of
the jury, he attributes the exclusion of hearsay to the court's determination
to prevent the jurors from being misled by unreliable testimony. That admissions are not hearsay was the position he took in his first edition. There
he seemed to say that they were not received for the truth of the matter
asserted in them. To what extent he has departed from that view may be
subject to debate. That they may be used as substantive evidence, rather
than for impeaching purposes only, he now concedes; but since in his second
edition he still continues to treat them under the sub-title Testimonial Impeachment, it may well be that he considers them as circumstantial rather
than direct evidence of the matters stated in them. Reported testimony, he
'believes, satisfies the hearsay rule. Other admissible hearsay utterances are
exceptions to the rule. For each of them he finds some guaranty of trustworthiness and some necessity for its use. To be sure, the guaranty is often
pretty slender, and the necessity may on occasion amount to no more than
28. If the exposition in the text is valid as to express admissions, it has at least equal
validity when applied to vicarious admissions. Whether admissions by conduct not intended
to express a proposition shall be classed as hearsay depends upon the acceptance or rejection
of the theory set forth in the second division of this article.
Nowhere in his article does Professor Strahorn explain how a jury can or will use any
narrative admission in any manner different from that in which it uses any other narrative
statement. He seems to assume that what he terms the process of double inference will furnish a theoretical basis for the use of utterances of a party or of one in "a relevant relation to
a party" different from that upon which the use of utterances of others is founded. Strictly
speaking, the first inference from the conduct of a person is to his state of mind as the cause
of the conduct, and the next from his state of mind to the condition or event causing that
state of mind. Thus the inconsistency between D's prior statement and his position at the
trial is the basis for an inference to D's state of mind, and when that is determined, it may
be the foundation for a further inference to the external events in issue. It may be argued
more loosely that D's former statement is used only to prove its inconsistency with his present
position, that the inconsistency justifies the inference that that position is false, and that this
falsity warrants the inference that the opposite of that position is true; which just happens to
coincide with the truth of the prior statement. But it is well settled that a finding by the trier
that a party is testifying falsely cannot serve as the basis for a further finding that the opposite of the testimony is true. See Hyslop v. Boston & Me. R. R., 2o8 Mass. 362, 94 N. E. 310
(191), 21 Axx. CAs. 1123; Moulton v. Moulton, 178 Minn. 568, 227 N. W. 896 (1929);
People v. Rides, 273 N. Y. 214, 7 N. E. (2d) 1O5 (1937).
29. See THAYEP, op. cit. spra note 3, at 519-521.
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convenience. From the viewpoint of the declarant, the guaranty may consist only of circumstances which would induce an ordinary man in his place
to desire to tell the truth or at least would offer him no inducement to
falsify. 30

And it is the subjective condition of the declarant which appears

to Mr. Wigmore to be of primary importance. With all this Professor Strahorn agrees, except that he finds in most of the exceptions nothing which will
stimulate the declarant to truth-telling but much that would make likely the
accuracy of his observation and recollection and perhaps of his narration.
Professor Strahorn prefers to speak in terms of intrinsic superiority rather
31
than of guaranties of trustworthiness.
This classification makes the subject-matter appear to have a unity and
rationality which it totally lacks. The hearsay rule, with its qualifications
and exceptions, cannot be explained solely as a device for protecting an
unskilled body of triers from misleading testimony. It is due quite as much,
if not more, to the adversary system of litigation. The rules governing the
reception of admissions find their explanation in the adversary theory of
litigation.3" If the jury is to be protected from testimony of a misleading
character, how can it be allowed to hear an extra-judicial statement of a
party to the action which was made under a positive stimulus to falsify, in
the form of an opinion, and based not on personal knowledge but upon self3o. Dean Wigmore may not be willing to vouch for all statements in the report of the
Commonwealth Fund Committee of which he was a member. In that report is the following
deduction concerning cases in which hearsay is received: "A study of the precedents leads
irresistibly to the conclusion that in these classes of cases the courts have in the main required merely that the declarant have knowledge of the facts and be so situated that the ordinary man under the same circumstances would normally speak the truth." MORGAN ET AL.,
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM (1927) 38. The chairman of that
committee is still of opinion that the conclusion is accurate in so far as the court looks to the
subjective condition of the declarant.
31. Strahorn, supra note I, at 500-509, 564-568. As will appear from various parts of the
text, the test of admissibility of a hearsay statement should, in the opinion of the writer, be
the capacity of the jury to put a fair value upon it. The subjective condition of the declarant
and the objective circumstances under which the declaration was made, as well as the character of the usual content of such a declaration, are factors which aid the court in determining
whether the proffered declaration belongs to a class of utterances which the jury may be
safely trusted to value with approximate accuracy. Whether the result be phrased in terms
of guaranty of trustworthiness or intrinsic superiority or capability of valuation is not of
great importance. The capacity of a jury to handle hearsay in a case in which competent
counsel and a competent trial judge are engaged has been greatly underestimated; and the
Massachusetts Hearsay Statute, MASS. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 233, § 65, goes a long way
toward removing much foolishness exhibited in the decisions.
32. This is true of vicarious admissions as well as of personal admissions. Statements
authorized by the adversary to be made should, of course, be treated as if he had made them.
Statements made by persons who stand in certain substantive relations to the adversary are
also considered as if he had made them. This may be due to the historical accident that early
judges confused substantive liabilities with evidence probative of them. As has been shown
elsewhere, most of the utterances admitted on this theory have been obviously and consciously
against the interest of the utterer. Only a very few cases can be found in which a selfserving statement was so received. Consequently the result of all but a small number of
decisions can be rationalized on another ground-a ground that appeals to reason. Whatever
unreason there is in this branch of the law cannot be explained away by calling an utterance
merely circumstantial evidence of the truth of the matter asserted in it, especially since the
courts receive it for its truth, the jury considers it like any other assertion, and in most instances it has no significance in favor of the proponent unless it is true.
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serving hearsay? 33 The decisions rejecting former testimony given in a
judicial proceeding subject to cross-examination upon the same issue by the
very party against whom it is now offered, because the proponent was not a
party to the former proceeding, can be justified on no rational ground but
can be partially explained by the notion that one adversary should not be
permitted to use a weapon denied to the other. The orthodox doctrine, which
confines the reception of dying declarations to those of the victim for whose
homicide the defendant is now being prosecuted, squares neither with the
adversary theory nor with the notion of protecting the jury. It rests upon
the conviction that such evidence is needed in homicide cases and that hearsay is better than no evidence. It is true that in many categories of admissible hearsay the utterance was made under circumstances which the courts
believe make it capable of reasonable evaluation by ordinary jurors. Whether
these circumstances are described as constituting a guaranty of trustworthiness or as giving the utterance "intrinsic superiority" is of little moment.
What is important is that the reasoning upon which the decisions in these
categories is based is at war with that upon which decisions in some other
categories are founded; and is fundamentally opposed to assumptions in
other closely related portions of the field of evidence.
An illustration will disclose what a conglomeration of inconsistencies
might occur in litigation growing out of a single accident. In a collision
between an automobile driven by X, in which A and B were riding, and an
automobile driven by S, the servant of D, X and A were severely injured.
A died within a few days, after making a dying declaration describing the
conduct of X and S just before and at the moment of the collision. X and
A's administrator brought separate actions against D. S was indicted for
the manslaughter of A. The action of X v. D was brought on for trial; X
testified at length and was subjected to a searching cross-examination by D.
Before D's testimony was concluded, a mistrial was declared. X died, and
his administrator was substituted as plaintiff. For the trials of X's Administratorv. D, A's Administratorv. D, and State v. S, the following items of
relevant evidence are available: (i) X's testimony at the trial of X v. D;
(2) the dying declaration of A; (3) a written statement made by D ten days
after the accident to the effect that S was driving at an excessive rate of
speed and was therefore unable to stop at the intersection at which the collision occurred. It is conceded that at the time of the accident, D was more
than IOOO miles distant. (4) An oral statement of X made to W that he
was driving fast and didn't notice that he was approaching the intersection
at which the collision occurred; (5) An affidavit by B that an instant before
33. This would be the effect of combining the following cases: Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
193 Mich. 170, 159 N. W. 151
(1916) ; Mayhew v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 52 S. W. (2d) 29 (Mo. App. 1932) ; Reed

v. Potter, 6o Kan. 8o8, 58 Pac. 471 (1899) ; Cady v. Doxtator,
v. McCord, I6o N. Y. 330, 54 N. E. 737 (899).
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the collision occurred X was looking back over his shoulder and talking to A
who was in the back seat.
Item (i) is admissible in the trial of X's Administrator v. D if the
applicable wrongful death statute is a so-called survival act; it is inadmissible
if the statute is like Lord Campbell's act; if the statute contains a combination of these two acts, then item (I) is admissible in so far as plaintiff is
trying to recover for damages suffered by X before his death, but inadmissible in so far as plaintiff is seeking damages for pecuniary loss caused to the
survivors by X's death.3 4 At the trial of A's Administrator v. D and of
State v. S, it is unqualifiedly inadmissible. Obviously item (i) is quite as
trustworthy, has quite as much intrinsic superiority, is quite as capable of
reasonably accurate valuation by the jury in one trial as in either of the
others, and that without regard to the provisions of the wrongful death act.
Only the sporting theory of the adversary system and the mysterious qualities of legal privity can account for these decisions of the orthodox courts.
Item (2) is inadmissible in each of the civil cases, but is admissible in
the criminal prosecution of S. If the indictment were for the manslaughter
of X, or for driving so as to endanger life, or for any offense except the
homicide of A, it would be inadmissible. Here again there can be no distinction between the trials based upon the character or value of the evidence.
The adversary theory would call for its rejection in all cases, the trustworthiness theory for its reception. Only the so-called policy of necessity for using
the evidence in homicide cases can explain its reception in the criminal case
and its rejection in the others.
Item (3) is admissible against D in both the civil actions, but is excluded
in the criminal prosecution. It is clear that if D were called as a witness, he
could not testify to these matters because of lack of first-hand knowledge.
The evidence would be regarded as practically worthless. Obviously it can
be worth no more in the civil cases than in the prosecution of A. Its reception in them offends every tenet of the trustworthiness test and is explained
only by the adversary theory.
Item (4) if offered by D in the case of X's Administratorv. D would
receive the same treatment as item (i), and for the same reason. It would
be excluded in the other civil case and in the criminal prosecution.
Item (5) would be inadmissible in all three cases. It would be clearly
relevant in the action of X's Administratorv. D, and it might be so in the
other two cases; but it is plainly hearsay and falls within no exception. If,
however, B had been called as a witness and had given testimony contrary to
the affidavit and had had his attention called to the affidavit, it would have
been received in evidence. It is, however, so lacking in intrinsic worth or
trustworthiness that the jury cannot be allowed to use it for its truth because
34. See Eldridge v. Barton, 232 Mass. 183, 122 N. E. 272 (igig).
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it may mislead them. Consequently they must be told that they cannot consider it as evidence of X's conduct; they can treat it only as an attack upon
the credibility of B as a witness; it may help them to determine whether to
believe B's testimony but it cannot help them in determining X's conduct.
It, therefore, seems not only futile but positively harmful to make a
classification of utterances which appears to give to the decisions an element
of coherent reasonableness which they lack. It is much better to class as
exceptions to the hearsay rule all groups of admissible utterances which are
offered for a purpose which requires the trier to treat the utterer as a witness
and which are made without being subject to cross-examination at the trial
in which they are so offered. This will require an exposition of the reasons
upon which each exception stands; it will stimulate comparison of one with
the other; it will expose the rulings for what they are, a hodgepodge of
inconsistencies due to the application of conflicting theories and historical
accidents. It will show what a shadow the original rule has become and may
persuade the courts to treat in sensible fashion non-verbal conduct which
they analyze as the equivalent of verbal hearsay. It will reveal the hopelessness of bringing order out of chaos by the slow process of judicial decision
and demonstrate the necessity for intelligent legislative action.

